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Abstract 
Recent evidence from Pakistan points to significant pro-male bias within households in the 
allocation of education expenditures. This raises two important questions: Is less spent on 
enrolled girls than boys through differential school-type choice for the two sexes, for example 
through a greater likelihood of sending boys to fee-charging private schools? And, if indeed 
this is the case, are girls thereby condemned to lower quality schooling, on average, than 
boys? By asking these questions, this paper makes three contributions to the literature. Firstly, 
this is one of a very few studies in Pakistan to explore the question of the relative 
effectiveness of public and private schools despite there being an unprecedented expansion of 
fee-charging private schools in the last two decades. Secondly, unlike existing papers which 
focus on primary schooling, this study looks at potential learning gaps by school-type for 
students in their last year of middle school (grade 8), very near their transition to secondary 
schooling. Thirdly, it exploits unique, purposively-collected data from government and 
private school students and thus, in estimating achievement production functions, is able to 
control for a number of variables typically ‘unobserved’ by researchers. The findings reveal 
that boys are indeed more likely to be sent to private schools than girls within the household, 
so that differential school-type choice is an important channel of differential treatment against 
girls. Private schools are also found to be of better quality – they are more effective than 
government schools in imparting mathematics and literacy skills. Girls lose out vis a vis boys 
in terms not only of lower within-household educational expenditures but also in terms of the 
quality of schooling accessed. 
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 Introduction 
A sizeable number of children of school-going age in Pakistan are not in school. Even 
more worryingly, a significantly larger number of girls are out of school than boys at all 
education levels - for every 100 enrolled boys (aged 5-9) only 82 girls were enrolled in 
primary school in 20041. These figures are a cause for concern especially if Pakistan is to 
meet the targets of universal primary education and promotion of gender equality by the year 
2015 set by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, while the MDGs spell 
out the importance of being in school, they say nothing about the quality of schooling while 
there. This is despite there now being almost universal agreement that what is learnt in school 
matters equally with, if not more than, the years of schooling acquired.  
The debate on school quality often centres on the public versus the private provision of 
education. A case for private schooling is made on several grounds, the cost to the 
government being one of the first - education provision is costly and governments worldwide 
are financially constrained. This need for supplementing education through the private sector 
is summarised in the Government of Pakistan’s recent statement that the government’s role in 
education “…is that of an enabler and facilitator, rather than a provider and sole producer” 
(GoP 2004, pp. 31). Private school expansion is also favoured on the grounds that charging 
fees increases accountability of schools towards parents and potentially also increases 
efficiency. Under certain conditions, competition generated through emergence of private 
schools may also improve efficiency of stagnant government sectors. These viewpoints 
suggest that organisational differences and differences in teacher incentives between private 
and government schools may be important.  
However, while numerous commentators take the view that public financing of schooling 
for all is needed, the public/private debate is helpful in understanding whether private 
management and provision of schooling is more efficient than typical public sector models. 
Some authors see private schools as playing only a peripheral role as ‘conduits’ for 
educational expansion in most developing countries (Lockheed and Jimenez, 1994). 
Moreover, unconstrained expansion of fee-charging schools is questioned on equity grounds: 
that they only cater to the elite in urban areas and marginalise the poor. These views have 
been challenged in Pakistan. Studies reveal an unprecedented expansion of private schooling 
rather than just a ‘peripheral’ role. Furthermore, evidence suggests that private schools do not 
cater only to the urban elite but are also utilised by the poor (Alderman, Orazem and Paterno, 
2001; Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2002). There is also some evidence that private schools can 
bridge gender gaps as even rural parents are seen willing to send their daughters to private co-
educational schools (Andrabi et al., 2002). However, it is important to note that these 
                                                 
1 Figures from: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/pakistan/mdgs.pdf 
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arguments do not affect the equity argument – where people feel they have no alternative 
(either because there is no public schooling available or is of very poor quality), parents may 
seek private schooling and this represents a constrained choice especially for the poor.  
Within the context of the school quality debate, this paper is motivated by two concerns. 
Firstly, a recent study in Pakistan finds large and statistically significant pro-male bias in 
within household education expenditure allocations in both the enrolment decision and the 
decision of how much to spend conditional on enrolment (Aslam and Kingdon, 2007). 
Secondly, as mentioned above, Pakistan has witnessed a mushrooming of private provision in 
the last two decades. There is also growing international interest in the question of whether 
there is a private school advantage and, if so, why it exists. These issues generate two 
important questions: 1) is less spent on enrolled girls than boys through differential school-
type choice for the two sexes, for example through a greater likelihood of sending boys to fee-
charging private schools than girls? And 2) if differential school-type choice is indeed the 
mechanism by which more is spent by families on sons’ than daughters’ education, is it the 
case that girls are thereby condemned to lower quality schooling, on average, than boys? That 
is, are private schools superior in quality and more effective than government schools in 
helping pupils to acquire learning?  
While three past studies in Pakistan aim to compare students’ learning differences in the 
two school types, their focus is on primary school pupils (Alderman et al., 2001; Arif and 
Saqib, 2003; Das, Pandey and Zajonc, 2006). To our knowledge, no study looks at the relative 
effectiveness of government and private schools at the middle-level despite the emergent need 
for investigating the issue at this level: a comparison of the relative concentration of private 
schools in Pakistan (1990-2004) shows that enrolment in private schools at the middle-level 
has expanded even more rapidly than enrolment at the primary level. For instance, while the 
proportion of children enrolled in private schools has remained fairly static at the primary 
level (about 11 per cent), private-share of middle school enrolment has expanded from 17 per 
cent in 1992 to 52 per cent in 20042. This suggests that private middle-schools are absorbing 
an increasingly higher proportion of school-age children.  
Moreover, investigating the quality of schools at this level is also important because 
middle-school (grade 8 in this study) is the year just before the transition to secondary school. 
While Pakistan is far from achieving the MDG ‘Universal Primary Education’ target, it is 
making slow progress towards achieving this goal. The obvious decision a primary school 
graduate (or his/her parent) has to make is between the no-school option and moving on to 
middle-school. Given the consensus that school quality is a key determinant of child school 
enrolment and further retention, quality has to be above a threshold-level to generate the 
                                                 
2 1992 figures from Pakistan Education Statistics (1992-1993), 2004 figures from Pakistan Economic 
Survey (2004-2005).   
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incentive for parents to invest in children’s further education. Evidence from other developing 
countries shows that while completion of 5 years of primary schooling generates significant 
non-market benefits especially to women’s education in some countries, the most universal 
benefits are associated with completing secondary schooling (Ainsworth, Beegle and 
Nyamete, 1996). The natural transition between the two levels is middle-schooling. Finally, 
middle-school is often the exit point from schooling altogether for girls as they reach puberty 
and approach ‘marriage-age’3. Coupled with this, many private schools (especially in rural 
areas and the very low-fee charging schools in urban locations) hire female teachers to keep 
salary costs low and, very often, these female teachers have acquired education only till the 
secondary level (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2006). Whether graduates from government and 
private schools differ in terms of learning acquired is, consequently, also important for the 
learning their students will acquire in the future if they become teachers.  
These considerations provide the rationales for studying the relative quality of the two 
school types at the middle-level of education. Lack of data has been a key constraint 
hampering research. In this study, we overcome this constraint by utilising two data sources. 
In the first instance, the nationally representative Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 
(PIHS 2002) is used to draw inferences about gender differences in school choices. However, 
as with most LSMS-type (Living Standards Measurement Studies) datasets, the PIHS does 
not have information on student achievement which would allow a ‘relative effectiveness’ 
comparison across school types. For this purpose, we utilise a purpose-built school-based 
survey conducted by the author in Lahore district in Punjab province, Pakistan in 2002-2003. 
Using stratified random sampling the survey collected data on 1887 pupils in any one 
section/class of grade 8 in 65 sample schools (40 private and 25 government) in urban and 
rural Lahore. Although limited to one district of the country, this dataset is unique in 
providing a very rich set of variables allowing estimation of achievement production 
functions. Moreover, as these data were collected exclusively with a view to methodological 
limitations facing researchers, we were able to collect information on a number of variables 
typically deemed ‘unobserved’. This allows us to convincingly proceed with a relative 
effectiveness comparison by school type at the middle-level in Pakistan.  
Data used in this study reveal that the public-private difference in raw student 
achievement in standardised tests is statistically significant. However, differences in raw 
scores may reflect differences in observed background characteristics as well as non-random 
selection into private and government schools which, in turn, induces correlation between 
private school attendance and unmeasured individual and family background effects 
favourable to pupil achievement. Recent studies of the relative efficiency of private and 
                                                 
3 While age-at-marriage is increasing, the mean marriage age for females is 17.9 among the 20-24 year 
old married youth (Sultana, 2005).  
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public schools take into account biases introduced by sample-selection. In the absence of 
experimental data, they rely on the Heckman two-step procedure which entails finding a 
credible and exogenous variable determining school-choice which does not directly affect 
achievement. However, since we control for a number of variables such as individual ‘ability’ 
and ‘motivation’, potentially generating sample selection in the first instance, our Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimates are not expected to differ significantly from the Heckman-
corrected ones. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Pakistan’s education 
system and the policies shaping its evolution. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics and 
estimates simple regressions to examine whether males are more likely to attend private 
schools in Pakistan. The methodologies used and the evidence from previous literature on 
relative effectiveness of school-types is reviewed in section 4. Section 5 shows econometric 
findings while Section 6 concludes.  
2. Overview of Schooling in Pakistan 
Broadly speaking, there are two main school types in Pakistan – government and 
private. In both school types, almost always, the formal education system comprises of 5 
years of primary, 3 years of middle, 2 years high (Matric/GCSE) and 2 years of higher 
secondary schooling (FA/FSc. Level/A’ Level). While similar in their educational structures, 
the two school-types differ in terms of financing and regulation. Government schools are 
heavily reliant on the state exchequer, although in recent years the system has become 
considerably decentralised and responsibility for the delivery and management of education 
has shifted to the districts (Devolution Plan 2001). Public schools often operate under poor 
regulatory environments. The government provides ‘free’ education up till primary. Although 
government primary schooling is mandated to be tuition-free and there are nominal fees in 
middle and high schools, low fees often mask significant non-fee expenditures in the form of 
uniform, books, transport, examination fees and even admission fees. Finally, government 
schools are almost always single-sex schools (exceptions occur when schools are co-
educational up till primary after which they become single-sex). 
 Private schools are privately-owned entities owned and managed by sole-proprietors, 
NGOs, trusts or other forms of management. Most often, the schools are for-profit and are 
owned by an individual entrepreneur. Although private institutions are required to be 
registered with the Education Department in the respective provinces, a large (and 
undocumented) number fail to do so. Registration is often obtained only by institutions 
needing government ‘recognition’ which allows students from the school to sit for public 
examinations. Often, however, unrecognised private schools evade this predicament by 
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sending their pupils to public examinations as ‘private’ candidates4. By remaining 
‘unrecognised’ the poorer private schools evade large (taxation and other) costs and 
consequently also remain unregistered. As a result, the true size of the private sector remains 
unmeasured through government statistics5. Moreover, this laxity in registration and 
recognition means that all unrecognised (and often a large number of recognised) private 
schools operate in very slack regulatory environments. This has significant consequences for 
the quality of schooling offered.  
By law, recognised private schools must charge fees approved by the Education 
Departments. There is great heterogeneity in private schooling: Private school fees range from 
exorbitantly high to relatively small amounts6. Moreover, unlike government schools, private 
schools are often co-educational. According to FBS (2001) estimates, 95 per cent and 96 per 
cent of all primary, middle, high and higher secondary private schools in Pakistan and Punjab 
in 2000 were co-educational7.  
The government’s decidedly pro-private policies in the education sector coupled with 
the poor performance of the government sector have resulted in an unprecedented expansion 
in private provision in Pakistan (Watson, 2005). According to FBS 2001, there were 36,096 
private institutions in Pakistan, catering to 6.3 million children in 20008. From 3,343 
institutions in 1983, private institutions at the primary, middle and high (up till Matric) levels 
in Pakistan increased to 33,238 by the year 2000, an expansion of more than 800 per cent in 
less than 20 years. In the year 2000, approximately 17 per cent of all primary, middle and 
higher secondary schools were private and accounted for approximately 21 per cent of total 
enrolment (roughly corresponding to 4.2 per cent and 6.9 per cent respectively in 1983)9.   
                                                 
4 It is possible to appear for public examinations either as a ‘Regular’ or ‘Private’ candidate. Regular 
candidates’ admissions for examinations are sent through recognised schools. Private candidates, on 
the other hand, send in their examination admissions without any institutional backing. This system has 
arisen historically as many candidates wish to take public examinations and obtain secondary or higher 
secondary school certificates without formally attending schools. This is especially true for females.  
5 Although the FBS (2001) claims to have interviewed both registered and unregistered schools, 
whether all unregistered schools have been documented in arguable. Despite the fact that my survey 
and fieldwork was conducted after the census of educational institutions had already been undertaken, 
there was no comprehensive list of the un-registered schools which had apparently been counted in the 
census. 
6 Alderman et al. (2001) in their study of schooling choices of low-income families in urban Lahore 
find that private schools catering to the urban poor charge low fees and the total educational 
expenditure on all heads (uniform, fees, transport etc.) in private schools is often comparable to that in 
government schools. In our sample, average private school fees range from Rs. 116/month to Rs. 
3766/month.    
7 Surprisingly, this is true even in rural areas: 93 per cent and 97 per cent of all private (primary, 
middle, high and higher secondary) schools in rural Pakistan and rural Punjab were co-educational 
(FBS 2001).  
8 It seems likely that the number of private schools and proportions enrolled in them are grossly 
underestimated as the unregistered sector is not fully accounted for.   
9 The 2000 estimates are based on two sources. Private school figures are from the Census of private 
institutions (2001) and total number of schools and enrolments in primary, middle and high schools are 
from the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook (2001). The figures from 1983 form a rough comparison as 
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Recent estimates in Pakistan show that much of the mushrooming of private schools 
has occurred in Punjab which houses roughly 50 per cent of the country’s total population - of 
the total (36, 096) private institutions in the country reported by FBS (2001), 66.4 per cent 
were in Punjab. Secondly, as Alderman et al. (2001) and Andrabi et al. (2002) point out, 
private schooling is no longer restricted to urban regions. According to the FBS Census 
figures, whereas 61 per cent of all private institutions are in urban areas, a relatively large 39 
per cent provide education in rural regions of the country. Finally, within the 34 districts of 
Punjab, the FBS (2001) reports Lahore10 having the largest number of private schools (3491), 
representing approximately 15 per cent of all private schools in Punjab (24325). This rich 
concentration of private schools in Punjab province and more specifically in Lahore district 
provides an ideal laboratory for investigating the relative effectiveness of private and public 
schools.  
3. School Choice: are boys more likely to attend private schools? 
This section looks at descriptive statistics and simple regressions to determine 
whether private and government schools differ in expense and if there is gender bias in the 
type of school attended by school-age children. The Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 
(PIHS 2002), the latest nationally representative dataset covering more than 16000 
households across the country is used.   
Table 1 shows the proportion of children enrolled in private schools across the four 
main provinces and in all Pakistan11. Clearly, conditional on enrolment, girls are not any less 
likely than boys to be enrolled in private schools. Indeed, except in the 20-24 age-group, girls 
are significantly more likely to be enrolled in fee-charging private schools as compared to 
boys. There are, however, striking provincial disparities. The evidence in Table 1 
corroborates Andrabi et al.’s (2002) findings that in terms of girls’ enrolment, private schools 
in Pakistan cater as much to girls as to boys. 
 Table 2 shows that expenditure (incurred on various heads of education, such as 
tuition fees, books, uniforms etc.) is consistently significantly greater in private as compared 
to government schools. This is true of all age-groups12. Jointly, Tables 1 and 2 reveal that 
although private schooling is significantly more expensive than government schooling, girls 
are as likely and in some instances more likely than boys to be enrolled in private schools.    
                                                                                                                                            
those figures are presumably based on numbers of and enrolments in primary, middle and high schools 
while the 2000 figures are based on primary, middle, high and higher secondary schools. 
10 Lahore is the second-largest city of Pakistan and the capital of Punjab and is categorised as a district 
with two sub-divisions: Lahore City and Lahore Cantonment (Cantt.) both of which have regions 
demarcated as urban and rural. 
11 This analysis is restricted to the 97 per cent children who are enrolled in government and private 
schools only.  
12 There were too few observations in the 20-24 group and thus it has not been included. 
7 
 
However, school choice is determined by a number of observed and unobserved 
household-level variables. For example, parents with more education, in certain occupations 
or with higher aspirations and greater motivation for child schooling may choose private 
schooling. Girls’ enrolment may be particularly sensitive to such factors. Therefore, girls 
attending any school and particularly those attending private school are likely to be a highly 
select sample from the population - selection stemming from observed and unobserved 
household characteristics.  
Given this consideration, Table 3 compares raw gender differences in private school 
enrolment (column b) with gender differences remaining after conditioning on observed 
household characteristics (column c) and again with gender differences remaining after 
controlling for both observed and unobserved household characteristics (column d). Column 
(c) estimates are obtained from the coefficient on the MALE dummy in a linear probability 
model (LPM) of private school choice fitted on all currently enrolled children, conditioning 
on observed household characteristics13. Column (d) estimates are obtained from the 
coefficient on the MALE dummy variable in a household fixed effects LPM of private school 
choice. The dependent variable is PRIVATE which equals 1 if child is enrolled in private 
school and 0 if in government school. In column (c) independent variables include the log of 
household size, log of per capita household expenditure, education and occupational status of 
the household head, dummy variables for the various provinces and constitutional regions and 
a dummy variable capturing urban regional status. A gender dummy variable (MALE) 
captures the impact of gender on the choice of private schooling14.  
The fixed-effects Linear Probability Models were fitted on the subset of households 
that had at least one child of each gender currently enrolled in school and in the relevant age 
group. According to raw data in column (b), among enrolled 5-9 year olds in all Pakistan, 
males are 1 percentage point more likely to be enrolled in private schools than females. There 
are provincial differences, with larger pro-male biases in Punjab and a pro-female bias in 
Sindh. However, controlling for household factors (observed and unobserved), there is a 
dramatic change. For all Pakistan, for example, the extent of the bias increases from 1 
percentage point to 5 and then to 8 percentage points (columns c and d).  
                                                 
13 Both OLS and probit models were estimated to examine whether linear probability models yield the 
same coefficients as probit estimates of school choice. This is important as small sample sizes in 
household fixed effects estimation (below) necessitate linear probability models. Since LPM and probit 
models yielded almost identical results, we can be confident in the use of LPM in household fixed 
effects estimation. Moreover, both LPM and probit are estimated with and without the province-gender 
interaction terms (for example MALE_PUNJAB, MALE_SINDH etc.). The models with interaction 
terms were used to determine whether males in a particular region are more or less likely to be enrolled 
in private schools as compared to girls. 
14 The underlying equations from the OLS/probit model estimates are available from the author.  
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  In summary, while at first glance evidence suggests that girls in Pakistan are not any 
less likely, and are in fact often more likely, than boys to be enrolled in private schools, 
conditioning on observed household characteristics changes the picture dramatically. 
Introducing household fixed-effects (to potentially control for unobserved household 
preferences) strengthens the finding that males in almost all age-groups and provinces are 
significantly more likely to attend (the more expensive) private schools as compared to girls. 
This suggests that one mechanism through which households achieve lower expenditure on 
education for girls is through a lower probability of sending them to private schools. Hence, 
gender differentiated school choice is an important mechanism through which large and 
significant pro-male education expenditure biases occur in Pakistan.   
This raises the question: do girls lose out not just in intra-household expenditure 
allocations but also in the quality of education acquired? If girls have poorer access to private 
schools and if these schools are more effective in imparting knowledge to their pupils, gender 
differences in private school access will also translate into differences in academic 
achievement. That girls have poorer access to private schools has been established. Whether 
private schools are more effective than government schools remains to be investigated. If they 
are, then given girls’ inferior access to private schools, it would suggest that, on average, girls 
face poorer quality schooling than boys in Pakistan. We investigate this question in the 
remainder of the paper.  
4.  Literature and Methodology 
It is a commonly held view that private schools are of better quality and consequently 
more ‘effective’ than government schools in Pakistan. This perception is formed by private 
schools’ better raw exam results than government schools; their being often English-medium 
schools; and their being sometimes affiliated to international secondary education exam 
boards, which are thought to improve labour market returns later in life. At the primary 
education level, Alderman et al. (2001), Arif and Saqib (2003) and Das et al. (2006) also find 
that private schools are better in imparting learning to pupils. At the middle-level, this issue is 
still largely untested. While some authors have argued that the small size of the private sector 
in most developing countries limits private-public comparisons (Glewwe and Patrinos, 1999), 
as section 3 revealed, this is clearly not the case in Pakistan.          
           The relative effectiveness of school types can be estimated using either one of two 
methodologies. In the first, effectiveness is measured as the premium (if any) of private 
schooling in labour market earnings among graduates of various school types15. Studies from 
                                                 
15 These studies have variously controlled for the standard Mincerian-earnings variables (such as 
education and experience) with some making efforts to control for the endogeneity of schooling arising 
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several countries point to a relative earnings advantage of private school graduates (see 
Brown and Belfield, 2001, for a review of studies in the UK and USA; Bedi and Garg, 2000 
for Indonesia; and Asadullah, 2005 for Bangladesh and Pakistan). Evidence from Pakistan 
also corroborates these findings: earnings of private school graduates are up to 31 per cent 
higher than those from government schools (see Nasir, 1999 and Asadullah, 2005). Our own 
estimates, using the PIHS (2002) show the private school earnings premium to be between 19 
and 27 per cent16.  
Alternatively, school-type effectiveness is measured as the difference in pupils’ 
learning achievement in the two school-types. Achievement differentials are estimated using 
education production functions with the outcome of schooling (in this case achievement score 
on standardised tests) regressed on educational inputs as follows: 
 
Ai = β Xi + μi         (1) 
 
In (1), Ai measures the achievement score of pupil i, X is a vector of variables 
assumed to determine achievement, β is the corresponding vector of coefficients to be 
estimated and μ is an error term. Clearly, relative effectiveness assessments cannot be based 
simply on comparisons of raw achievement scores with the claim that the school type with the 
higher score is more ‘effective’ in imparting learning. Pupil achievement is affected by a wide 
array of factors including individual characteristics (such as innate ability and motivation), 
family background such as the home learning environment, parental education etc.17, and 
even pre-school experiences (see Behrman, Hoddinott, Maluccio, Soler-Hampejesk, Ramirez 
and Stein, 2005). To the extent that such factors affect parental schooling choices (e.g. 
children from more privileged backgrounds or with more educated or motivated parents may 
systematically select into private schools), the government and private school samples will be 
non-random draws from the population and generate sample-selectivity issues (discussed 
later).  
                                                                                                                                            
from ‘ability bias’ and other biases. However, given data limitations, more often they rely on OLS or 
sample-selectivity corrected estimates while recognising the limitations faced.    
16 Using the PIHS, we estimated earnings functions incorporating the standard education/experience 
variables and a dummy variable, PRIVATE (equals 1 if individual was enrolled in a private school 
when of school-going-age and 0 otherwise). Three additional variables were included: READ = 1 if 
individual can ‘read in any language with understanding’, 0 otherwise, WRITE = 1 if individual can 
‘write in any language with understanding, 0 otherwise’, and MATHS = 1 if individual can ‘solve 
simple (plus minus) sums, 0 otherwise. As READ/WRITE/MATHS may be correlated with PRIVATE, 
the first specification introduces them independently to capture their effect, if any on earnings before 
introducing the school-type dummy. The results are suppressed due to space constraints but the main 
findings are reported above. See Aslam (2007) for details of underlying regressions of earnings 
functions.  
17 One of the most robust findings in educational research is that a child’s educational attainment is 
consistently driven by family background (Chevalier et al., 2004, pp.1). 
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In the literature two main approaches have been adopted in the estimation of 
education production functions that explicitly take into account different school types: (1) a 
private school dummy approach in a pooled sample (government and private) and (2) 
estimation of two separate achievement equations for private and government schools. In the 
first approach a single achievement function is estimated for the full sample of students, and a 
private school dummy variable is included with the coefficient on the dummy measuring the 
private school achievement advantage. However, if ‘motivation’ or innate ability are in the 
error term, in pooled samples they generate a correlation between the school-type dummy and 
the error term, violating a basic assumption of classic linear regressions. The evidence on 
private school advantage using this approach is mixed (see for instance Psacharopoulos, 1987; 
Williams and Carpenter, 1991; Mizala and Romaguera, 2000; Somers et al., 2001 and 
McEwan, 2000). 
We are aware of three regression analyses that compare achievement differentials 
among children in different school-types in Pakistan. A study by Arif and Saqib (2003) uses 
the dummy-variable approach and purpose-built data on government, private and NGO 
schools located across six districts in Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and AJK. The 
authors administered questionnaires to grade 4 (primary school) pupils, their parents, teachers 
and school heads. In total, 50 schools were sampled across the country yielding 965 primary 
school boys and girls. Tests of numeracy, literacy and life-skills/general knowledge were 
administered to all pupils to obtain measures of cognitive skills. The quality difference in 
school-types was measured through inclusion of two dummy variables (‘NGO school’ and 
‘private school’, with ‘government schools’ as the base category) in achievement functions. 
Private school pupils are found to perform significantly better than those in government 
schools while this was not true for NGO school students.  
The study by Alderman et al. (2001) remains the most methodologically sound and 
convincing study of private-public schools to date. Using an area-frame sampling 
methodology, the authors identified low-income areas in Lahore District and conducted 
household-level and school-level surveys. Tests of Urdu and mathematics were administered 
to a subset of third-grade children. Achievement production functions were fitted including a 
school-type dummy. However, non-random assignment of pupils in private schools was 
controlled using the estimated predicted probability of private school enrolment based on 
logit estimates of school-choice. The authors found that, controlling for home background and 
school inputs, children in private schools performed better than their government school 
counterparts. The key strength of this study is that the data are based on a household-level 
survey and does not ignore selectivity into particular school-types relative to children not 
attending school at all. Moreover, the author’s extremely rich data help convincingly identify 
school-type in the achievement production functions.  
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Finally, a recent study by Das, Pandey and Zajonc (2006), uses a rural sample of 828 
schools from 114 villages in three districts of Punjab (Attock, Faisalabad and Rahim Yar 
Khan) randomly testing 10 pupils in grade 3 in every school in the chosen village. The tests 
were conducted in English, Urdu and Mathematics. At one point, the authors compare the 
‘adjusted’ and ‘unadjusted’ knowledge score gaps by school type. The ‘unadjusted’ gaps 
represent the mean difference in pupil scores in the three tests while the adjusted gap is the 
coefficient on private schools in a child-level OLS regression that includes wealth, father 
literacy, mother literacy, gender, age, age squared and a village-level fixed effect. Their data 
also corroborate the findings of the two previous studies and confirm that private school 
pupils outperform public school counterparts in all three subjects. The authors also note that 
there is no decrease in the gaps after conditioning on the covariates (i.e. the adjusted and 
unadjusted gaps are roughly identical). This finding appears to suggest that differences in 
schools rather than differences in family background generate learning differences. This is not 
surprising given the relative homogeneity in socio-economic status that one would expect in 
rural areas in Pakistan.   
The findings from the three studies in Pakistan reported above suggest that in urban 
and rural Pakistan private school pupils outperform public school counterparts, at least at the 
primary level. However, all three studies adopt the dummy variable approach which may be 
restrictive as it imposes the vector of coefficients in both school types to be identical. There 
may be important differences in characteristics of individuals across the two school-types 
which may interest researchers. The private school dummy may also be endogenous. The 
alternative to the ‘Dummy variable’ approach overcomes one of the methodological 
limitations (constraining the vector of coefficients) by fitting two different achievement 
production functions, one each for the private and public school samples. Relative 
effectiveness of the two school-types can then be estimated using a variation of Oaxaca’s 
(1973) methodology, asking the question: if we were to randomly choose an individual with 
the average characteristics of the entire student population in our sample, say X , would this 
pupil perform better in a government or private school?  Equation (1) can be estimated 
separately for the two school-types: 
 
 AiG = βG XiG + μiG         (2) 
 AiP = βP XiP + μiP         (3) 
 
where i denotes the ith pupil, G and P are subscripts representing government and private 
schools, A denotes the achievement score of each pupil and X denotes personal and family 
background characteristics of pupils. Equations (6) and (7) estimate education production 
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functions controlling for home background characteristics of pupils and the β coefficients are 
derived accordingly. The error terms, μ are assumed to be randomly and normally distributed. 
  We can predict a score ( ˆGA ) by using the average characteristics of the entire student 
population and using the coefficients derived from (6). This would be the average student’s 
predicted score if she were to attend a government school. Similarly, we can predict a score 
ˆ
PA by using coefficients derived from (7) and using the average characteristics of the entire 
student population. This would be the average student’s predicted score in a private school. 
The achievement advantage of private schools over government schools can simply be 
calculated as the difference in predicted scores: ( ˆ ˆP GA A− ). 
However, estimating achievement production functions on students in different 
subsamples (of school-type) generates sample selectivity concerns. This may arise if 
individuals select themselves into private or government schools in a non-random way - those 
who benefit most from being in a certain school-type are also most likely to be in it (self 
sorting). It is often observed in South Asian countries that more educated and well-off parents 
choose to send their children to fee-charging private schools and that free government schools 
are often the choice of the poor and uneducated. If parental education is positively correlated 
with unobserved parental ability and if there is intergenerational transmission of ability, then 
more able children will systematically select into private schools. Alternatively, private 
schools may cream-off the most able pupils through entrance tests (hierarchical sorting).  
Heckman (1979) suggested a method of overcoming the bias associated with sample 
selectivity. Although the implementation of the Heckman two-step procedure is fairly simple, 
the challenge is in finding valid exclusion restrictions – i.e. at least one variable directly 
affecting choice of school type and not directly explaining pupil achievement (i.e. not in Xi). 
Studies in the past have often used family background and school characteristics as 
identifying exclusion restrictions but these have been questioned (Altonji, Elder and Taber 
2002, and Glewwe, 2001). Many of the family background variables cannot be credibly 
excluded from achievement functions while school-level variables are the consequence rather 
than the determinants of school-choice. For instance, Altonji et al. (2002) argue that religious 
affiliation and proximity to school, often used in identifying the Catholic school-effect in US 
studies, are not valid instruments as they directly determine pupil achievement. However, data 
limitations imply that identifying exclusion restrictions are often justified on empirical 
grounds, i.e. on the grounds that they (de facto) are insignificant in the achievement equation 
but significant in the school-choice equation.   
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Pioneering work rigorously comparing the relative effectiveness and efficiency18 of 
school types in five educationally diverse developing countries using the Heckman approach 
was conducted by a group of World Bank researchers (see Jimenez et al., 1991a; and 
Lockheed and Jimenez, 1994, for a summary of the main findings). The authors used data on 
achievement of secondary school pupils in Colombia and Tanzania (Cox and Jimenez, 1990), 
the Dominican Republic (Jimenez et al., 1991b), the Philippines (Jimenez et al., 1988a) and 
Thailand (Jimenez et al., 1988b). The studies had a common methodology and found 
comparable results. In all five country-settings, even after controlling for student background 
and sample selection biases, private school pupils consistently outperformed those in 
government schools in verbal and mathematics tests. Moreover, the unit costs of private 
schools were lower than those of public schools. This was a key finding as it suggested that 
private schools were also relatively more efficient in the use of their inputs (such as teachers) 
which reinforced their achievement advantage.   
Kingdon’s (1996) examination of the relative effectiveness and efficiency of different 
school types in urban Lucknow District in the Uttar Pradesh state of India also used the 
Heckman approach to correct for sample selection bias. It confirmed the findings of the 
aforementioned studies - that private school pupils learn more than their government school 
counterparts. However, more recent evidence on the private school advantage is mixed. For 
instance, Lassibillie and Tan (2001) counter the previous evidence in Tanzania (Jimenez et al. 
1990; Psacharopoulos, 1987), finding instead that public (secondary) schools are more 
efficient in imparting achievement to pupils as compared to private schools. However, Tooley 
(2005) corroborates Kingdon’s (1996) findings for primary and secondary school pupils in 
poor areas of Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), India.  
Increasing use is now made of experimental designs to overcome problems of sample 
selection within the school-choice literature. This approach is more convincing as it involves 
experiments to randomly assign children to ‘treatment’ (private) and ‘control’ (government) 
groups and assesses differences in educational outcomes among them. If school-type is 
allocated randomly, one can be more sure that the differences in achievement (if any) among 
pupils in the two school types are due to differences in school-type rather than due to 
differences in family or individual unobserved characteristics (see Angrist et al. ,2002 and 
Cullen, Jacob and Levitt, 2005). However, experimental studies exert stringent data 
requirements which are often not met especially in developing countries and researchers have 
to rely on older, often more unconvincing approaches, to compare achievement by school 
type. 
While most studies are unable to directly control for the variables generating 
                                                 
18 Efficiency comparisons are based on comparing the cost-effectiveness of various school-types.  
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endogeneity and sample selectivity due to data constraints, the present study uses 
purposively-collected data to examine the relative effectiveness of school types in Pakistan.  
Consequently, we have measures for a number of variables usually deemed ‘unobserved’ 
including measures of child motivation (EDU_WISH = how much education child wishes to 
acquire), the home learning environment (FREE_HELP = number of hours of help with 
school work provided by any parent, siblings or relatives) and a proxy of child ability 
obtained through testing each child on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test (RAVEN = 
score on Ravens test)19. Including these controls should reduce some of the biases that plague 
other studies. Moreover, our study is also better able to capture a large array of observed 
individual and family factors conditioning on which is important for valid inferences about 
pupil achievement in the various school-types. At the outset, therefore, we do not expect our 
OLS achievement production functions to differ significantly from Heckman-corrected ones, 
a suspicion confirmed in the empirical work which follows.  
5. Data, Estimation and Results 
Data 
The data for this study comes from a purpose-built school-based survey conducted by 
the author in Lahore district in Punjab province, Pakistan in 2002-2003. Using stratified 
random sampling on 65 schools (25 government and 40 private) in urban and rural Lahore, 
the survey collected detailed data on 1887 pupils in any one section of grade 8th in each 
sample school. Each pupil filled out a questionnaire containing questions on personal 
characteristics (age, motivation20, gender etc.), parental and family background (parental 
education and occupation, family structure and size, wealth and income etc.), schooling 
(books prescribed in school, length of the school week, family expenditure on schooling in 
the past year, hours of home tuition taken etc.) and opinions on various issues such as how 
important did they think schooling was for girls as compared to boys. In addition, each child 
took the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test and tests of numeracy and literacy21. The 
                                                 
19 It has been suggested that this measure of pupil’s innate ability is possibly endogenous in that it is 
not independent of the child achievement level. However, as long as there is some exogenous element 
in the Raven’s test, it does provide a valid measure of ability and several studies have used it as such. 
20 In most studies, motivation or child’s educational aspirations are not controlled for. In our purpose 
designed study, special care was taken to obtain a measure, albeit not a perfect one, to capture child 
motivation. We asked the child the question: ‘What is the highest level of education you wish to 
attain?’ with all possible educational levels (such as Middle school or upto 8th grade, Matric or grade 
10 etc.) as answer choices. 
21 The Raven’s Progressive Matrices test has been used extensively in studies around the world in an 
attempt to control for the ever-elusive ‘ability’. The test consists of 60 items arranged in five sets (A, B, 
C, D, & E) of 12 items each. Each item contains a figure with a missing piece. Below the figure are 
either six or eight alternative pieces to complete the figure, only one of which is correct. Each set 
involves a different principle or "theme" for obtaining the missing piece, and within a set and across the 
sets, the items are roughly arranged in increasing order of difficulty. This test was designed to measure 
a person’s ability to reason by analogy independent of language and formal schooling. Although there 
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literacy and numeracy tests were developed by the Educational Testing Service (ETS) for use 
by Knight and Sabot in their study in Africa (see Boissiere et al. 1985) and have been 
discussed extensively in Knight and Sabot (1990). We adapted these tests to the Pakistani 
context, reduced the number of questions to test the pupils within a given time frame, and 
translated them into Urdu to administer them to children in the national language when the 
school was Urdu-medium.  
Finally, each child was weighed and their height and arm circumference measured. 
The survey also collected information on a total of 339 teachers who taught the pupils in the 
section of grade 8 that was sampled in each school and collected data on school resources and 
expenditures by interviewing head teachers of the schools. Finally, mostly for consistency 
checks and for additional information, each child was sent home with a ‘parents 
questionnaire’ which was filled out by the parent (or the child asking the parent questions if 
parent was illiterate) and returned to school authorities the next day. Information on 1770 
parent questionnaires was collected and collated.  
Achievement Differences: Private and Government Schools  
Table 4 describes the variables used in OLS estimates and later in the Heckman 
school choice probit and corresponding achievement functions. Table 5 sets out the means, 
standard deviations and t-values of the differences across private and government schools. As 
Table 5 shows, the maximum mark in the achievement test is 50. It also reveals that private 
school pupils achieve on average 6 points more on standardised tests of literacy and 
mathematics (ACHIEVE) than government school students. This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. However, it cannot soely be attributed to a school-type 
effect as it is also apparent that in almost all respects, private school pupils come from 
relatively more privileged backgrounds. For example, they are significantly more motivated 
(EDU_WISH), and have more conducive home learning environments (a significantly larger 
number of books at home and lower number of siblings). Moreover, they have more educated 
parents who are wealthier and more likely to be professionally employed.   
Initially, achievement production functions are fitted on the pooled sample 
(government and private school pupils) and OLS estimates obtained with and without a 
PRIVATE school dummy. The results are reported in Table 6. The table examines whether 
the 6 points raw private school achievement advantage remains after conditioning on 
individual and family background characteristics. Almost all variables have the expected 
signs – for instance ability (RAVEN) has a significantly positive association with 
achievement as does the child’s educational aspiration (EDU_WISH). The first cut at the data 
                                                                                                                                            
is some controversy about how independent this instrument really is of formal schooling, the raw score 
yields an estimate of ability which is arguably better than not having any estimate at all. 
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reveals that having controlled for a number of covariates, learning achievement does not 
differ significantly by gender. Moreover, comparing across (a) and (b), the large and 
significantly positive coefficient of PRIVATE suggests a substantial private school 
achievement advantage even after controlling for individual and family background. Although 
this falls from a raw advantage of 6 points to a ceteris paribus advantage of 2.5 points, it 
equals a 0.35 standard deviation of the achievement score.  
However, the PRIVATE school dummy is potentially endogenous. Pooled sample 
specifications also constrain the values of the coefficients on the variables other than school-
type to be equal in both school-types. This may be especially restrictive for the effect of 
gender which may vary by school-type. Therefore, we estimate education production 
functions on sub-samples of government and private school pupils separately. As mentioned 
before, we do not expect our OLS estimates on sub-samples of private and government school 
pupils to differ significantly from Heckman-corrected estimates as our rich controls include, 
among others, measures of ability and motivation (albeit imperfect).  
The Heckman two-step results are reported in the Appendix. Table A1 shows the 
school-choice probit. The base category is government schools.  We experimented with a 
large number of variables as potential exclusion restrictions and report the results for 
specifications with strongest selectivity effects. The exclusion restrictions (WEALTH1, 
FSELFEMP, FPROFEMP and FEDYRS) are jointly significant at the 1 per cent level and 
WEALTH1 and FPROFEMP are individually significant at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, 
respectively22. As with any cross-sectional study, the difficulty of finding credible exclusion 
restrictions remains but we use mainly an empirical justification. The four identifying 
variables lacked significance in achievement functions but were significant in the school-type 
probit. While it could be argued that father’s occupation affects school-type choice by 
affecting earnings and should not have an impact on achievement, the results should be 
interpreted with caution because this theoretical justification for the exclusion restrictions is 
somewhat weak. 
   Three separate selection-corrected equations are fitted in each of the private and 
government sub-samples – with ACHIEVE, READ and MATHS as the dependent variables. 
ACHIEVE is the sum of READ and MATHS and takes on a maximum value of 50. READ 
and MATHS take on maximum values of 25 each. These are reported in Table A2. In both 
(government and private) sub-samples, the lambda terms have small positive coefficients. The 
signs on λ are consistent with more able and motivated children being more likely to be 
enrolled in both government and private schools. Moreover, the lambda terms are statistically 
                                                 
22 We experimented with the WEALTH variable by including it in various forms in achievement 
functions. The quadratic term was also insignificant in all specifications. It was also insignificant in the 
school-choice probit and hence excluded to achieve a parsimonious specification. 
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insignificant with t-values of 1.38 and 0.40 in government and private samples, respectively. 
We had anticipated significant selectivity effects. Results reveal to the contrary. As argued 
above, one reason could be that the rich variables included in our achievement equation are 
good at capturing effects of unobservables on achievement. Another could be the high 
standard errors on lambda, which could arise because of the high collinearity of lambda with 
some of the variables in the achievement functions (Lambda is derived from stage 1 probits 
and many of the variables included in stage 1 are also included in stage two). Finally, it 
remains possible that lambda is not well identified because the first stage equation is not 
properly specified: it contains a number of variables that are potentially endogenous.  
The coefficient on the lambda term measures the bias due to non-random sample 
selection. We anticipated that because of the rich controls for family background and 
individual ability and motivation allowed by our data, the Heckman-corrected results would 
not differ significantly from OLS regressions on sub-samples. This is also confirmed through 
the Hausman specification test comparing the Heckman two-step model (on ACHIEVE) 
against the OLS in the government and private sub-samples23. The coefficients of the 
variables in the Heckman equation are insignificantly different from those in the OLS 
equations. Thus, we discuss the main findings from OLS models estimated on sub-samples of 
private and government school pupils below.  
However, the OLS models estimated below are imperfect as the endogeneity of 
various variables in the achievement production functions remains. Whatever the underlying 
cause of endogeneity may be (reverse causation, correlation of included regressor with error 
term or measurement error), it generates biased parameter estimates of all included variables. 
Consequently, one cannot provide a causal interpretation to the parameter estimates.  
 
Discussion of OLS Results 
Tables 7 and 8 report OLS equations of pupil achievement in Achieve, Reading and 
Maths in the government and private sub-samples. Note that the R2 values of the government 
sub-sample in the Achievement, Reading and Maths production functions are much lower 
than in the private sample. This could be because of lesser variation in the dependent 
variables ‘ACHIEVE’, ‘READ’ and ‘MATHS’ in the government sample than in the private 
sample (this smaller variation is clear from the kernel density of ACHIEVE in the 
government than in the private sector, reported in the Figure 1). 
                                                 
23 In the government sub-sample, the computed chi-2 statistic (12) is 1.89 while in the private sample, 
the computed chi-2 (12) is 0.16 respectively. The critical chi-2 statistics at 12 degrees of freedom is 
21.03 at the 5% level. We can accept the Ho that the difference in coefficients between Heckman and 
OLS is not systematic.  
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Focus first on ACHIEVE (overall achievement scores) in the first columns of Tables 
7 and 8. In private schools males outperform their female counterparts while no such MALE 
achievement advantage exists in government schools. Moreover, male students perform 
significantly better than females in Maths in both school types while female students perform 
better in Reading (although the effect is significant only in government schools). Delving 
further, the pro-male bias in overall achievement in private schools arises from a large and 
significant pro-male achievement advantage in Maths scores (males achieve 1.6 points more 
as compared to females). Although there is a pro-female Reading advantage in private 
schools, this is small (0.01 points) and not significant. In government schools, however, a 
large and significant pro-male Mathematics advantage (1.3 points) is matched by a large and 
significant pro-female advantage in Reading scores (1.2 points).  
Gender differences in achievement have been variously attributed. Males and females 
may vary in their individual attributes as well as family-specific attributes especially in 
parental attitudes and expectations. Studies in the USA have found differing parental attitudes 
and expectations towards daughters and sons with less confidence being reported in 
daughters’ mathematics skills as compared to sons’ (Kimball, 1989, Stockdale, 1995). An 
intergenerational transfer of attitudes may result in girls’ (and possibly even female teachers’) 
perception of mathematics as an unimportant or a difficult subject for girls. Also, differences 
in achievement may arise due to biological and psychological factors (see Mellanby, Maxtin 
and O’Doherty, 2000). Moreover, teaching techniques may be dissimilar for male and female 
children or there may be well-entrenched stereotypes in pupil assessment (McNabb, Pal and 
Sloane, 2001). For example, research on mathematics achievement has found that the extent 
of academic and non-academic interaction within class rooms is much greater for males and 
that males receive more praise and encouragement as compared to females (Kimball, 1989)24.  
In both school-types, RAVEN and EDU_WISH are significant determinants of 
achievement, reading and maths scores and have the expected signs. Whether a child has 
private home tuition (HTU_TAKEN) seems to have a perverse sign though it is statistically 
significant only in government schools. A possible explanation is that poor performance in 
school induces parents to complement child schooling with home-tuition. Student 
absenteeism is significantly negatively associated with pupil achievement in most cases.  
 
Relative Effectiveness 
 This section investigates whether private school pupils learn more than their 
government school counterparts. Relative effectiveness is computed in the way described 
                                                 
24 For a comprehensive study of gender differences in academic achievement in Kenya, see Appleton 
(1994). 
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above. We predict scores for government and private school pupils, ˆGA  and ˆPA , by ascribing 
to them the average characteristics of the entire student population and using the coefficients 
derived from estimated achievement equations (2) and (3). The achievement advantage of 
private schools over government schools is calculated as the difference in predicted scores:  
( ˆ ˆP GA A− ). We estimate predicted scores using the OLS coefficients (Tables 7 and 8) as our 
preferred estimates. Table 9 reports findings. The Heckman-corrected results of standardised 
achievement scores are also presented in Table 9 for the sake of comparison and are clearly 
not very different from the OLS findings. 
The raw (unadjusted) achievement, maths and reading differentials show a substantial 
private school advantage, scoring 5.8, 3.3 and 2.5 points more, on average, than government 
school pupils in tests of achievement, maths and reading, respectively. However, the raw 
advantage of private schools in both subjects (and in total achievement) falls greatly when 
individual and family background effects are controlled for. This is true for both OLS and 
Heckman estimates. For example, among the OLS results, the raw achievement score of 
private school pupils (26.60 points) is 28 per cent higher than that of government school 
pupils (20.79 points). But, standardising for background, the difference falls to 12 per cent.  
This suggests that, of the total raw achievement advantage of private school pupils over 
government school counterparts (5.81 points), 54 per cent is explained by student intake while 
46 per cent (2.65 points) can be attributed to school effects. In other words, roughly half the 
pupil advantage in achievement in private schools is due to pupil intake and the other half due 
to school effects. This corroborates, to a large extent, the finding by Das et al. (2006) of what 
they call the ‘primacy of schools’ in rural Pakistan suggesting that improvements in learning 
are at least partially amenable to policy. However, we do find that student intake explains a 
larger proportion of achievement gaps between school-types, which is not unexpected given 
the predominantly metropolitan nature of our sample compared to a fully rural sample from 
Das et al.’s study.    
We wish to examine whether the two school types are equally effective in imparting 
mathematics and reading skills. The predicted Maths score of a child in a private school (9.63 
points) is 19 per cent higher than his/her predicted score in a government school (8.10 points). 
Similarly, the predicted reading score of an average pupil in a private school is 8 per cent 
higher than in a government school. Thus, private schools are relatively more effective than 
government schools in imparting maths and reading skills to their pupils. The size of the 
private school advantage is substantial. The 2.65 point advantage in achievement is equal to 
about 0.40 standard deviations of the raw average achievement score of the sample as a 
whole. Because the equations underpinning the predicted score estimates do not include 
school-level factors, the finding of a private school advantage captures the relative advantage 
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arising from differences in tangible school inputs as well as the use of those inputs 
(management differences). 
 
6. Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to examine the relative effectiveness of school-
types at the middle-school level in Pakistan. This curiosity arose because of the recent finding 
by Aslam and Kingdon (2007) that intra-household educational expenditure allocations are 
significantly pro-male. One explanation for this could be a higher probability of boys being 
sent to private schools. If this is true and if private schools are more effective in imparting 
learning to pupils, then girls lose out not only in terms of educational expenditures but also in 
terms of schooling quality. Evidence from nationally representative household survey data 
presented in section 3 showed that girls do have substantially and significantly poorer access 
to private schools than do boys. We find, in addition, that private schools are indeed of better 
quality: they are 19 and 8 per cent more effective in imparting mathematics and literacy skills, 
respectively, than government schools. Thus, our evidence suggests that girls do lose out vis a 
vis boys in terms not only of lower educational expenditures but also in terms of the quality of 
schooling accessed, at least in the district of Lahore.  
At the outset, we noted various problems in analysing the relative effectiveness of 
school types, including endogeneity of school-type dummies in pooled samples and sample 
selectivity concerns in sub-sample analyses. However, given the unique dataset available to 
us, it is also arguable that we control for important components of a number of variables (such 
as motivation and ability) that partially generate these biases. Consequently, the main findings 
of our study are based on OLS models. Although we recognise that these models may still 
suffer from endogeneity bias, estimating structural equations underpinning the relative 
effectiveness computations is nevertheless a worthwhile exercise. Even after including a rich 
set of controls, the evidence points to a large and significant private school achievement 
advantage.   
This finding is validated on various grounds. Firstly, earnings function estimates 
show earnings premia for private school graduates in the labour market. This indicates that 
employers believe private schooling to be of better quality, leading to more productive 
workers. Secondly, as section 2 highlights, the unprecedented expansion of fee-charging 
schools in Pakistan in the last two decades is consistent with parents perceiving private 
schools to be of better quality. Finally, empirical evidence (international and national) 
corroborates the findings of this study. The discovery of a relative learning advantage of 
private schools is consistent with evidence from Colombia (Angrist, et. al., 2002), India 
(Kingdon, 1996), Thailand (Jimenez et al., 1988a), Philippines (Jimenez et al. 1988b) and 
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from the Dominican Republic (Jimenez et al., 1991) though it is not consistent with evidence 
from 10 Latin American countries (Somers et al., 2001) and from Argentina and Chile 
(McEwan, 2000). Importantly, however, evidence from Pakistan validates the current finding 
of a private school advantage (Alderman et al., 2001; Arif and Saqib, 2003; Das et al., 2006). 
These past studies find private schools to be more effective in imparting learning among 
primary school pupils, a finding confirmed for the middle schooling level in this paper.  
It is important to note that the analysis of pupil achievement in this study controls 
only for individual characteristics and family background. In estimating achievement 
production functions, school inputs and information on costs are not used as controls. This 
means that while we can argue that there is a significant private school achievement 
advantage, we cannot underpin whether this is because of differences in school resources and 
inputs or even in the differential use of these inputs in the two school types. To draw more 
informed conclusions about the relative effectiveness of the two school-types, one would also 
need to incorporate an analysis of the relative costs of government and private schools. This is 
an exercise left for future work25.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Detailed cost data were also collected from all schools sampled in the survey.  
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 Figure 1: Kernel Densities (ACHIEVE) by school-type 
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
A
ch
ie
ve
m
en
t
0 10 20 30 40 50
x
kdensity ACHIEVE kdensity ACHIEVE
Solid line represents private and dashed government
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table 1: Private School enrolment, conditional on enrolment: by gender, age category and province 
(weighted) 
 
Age group 
% of Girls in 
private schools 
 
(a) 
% of Boys in 
private schools 
 
(b) 
Difference 
 
 
(c) = (b) – (a) 
t-value of the 
difference 
 
(d) 
Age 5-9     
Punjab 31.9 35.5 3.6 1.92 
Sindh 29.7 24.9 -4.8 -1.95 
NWFP 18.8 20.4 1.6 0.72 
Balochistan 6.5 8.3 1.8 0.71 
Pakistan 29.3 30.2 0.9 0.67 
     
Age 10-14     
Punjab 29.6 23.6 -6.0 -3.02 
Sindh 26.8 18.7 -8.1 -2.36 
NWFP 12.3 16.3 4.0 1.61 
Balochistan 4.3 5.8 1.5 1.10 
Pakistan 25.8 20.6 -5.2 -3.73 
     
Age 15-19     
Punjab 22.9 18.7 -4.3 -1.40 
Sindh 19.1 16.9 -2.1 -0.59 
NWFP 12.8 10.3 -2.5 -0.73 
Balochistan 6.1 3.7 -2.4 -1.00 
Pakistan 20.1 15.8 -4.3 -2.16 
     
Age 20-24     
Punjab 20.2 24.6 4.4 0.57 
Sindh 5.6 13.3 7.7 1.33 
NWFP 13.8 8.1 -5.7 -0.67 
Balochistan 0.0 3.6 3.6 1.64 
Pakistan 13.4 16.1 2.7 0.65 
     
All ages 5-24     
Punjab 29.6 27.9 -1.7 -1.27 
Sindh 26.2 20.6 -5.6 -2.93 
NWFP 15.6 16.6 1.0 0.58 
Balochistan 5.4 6.2 0.8 0.62 
Pakistan 26.4 23.6 -2.8 -3.09 
Note: Computed from the PIHS (2001-2002). Positive t-value indicates a pro-male bias in enrolment. Highlighted cells indicate t-values 
significant at 10% or more. Sampling weights applied. 
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Table 2: Annual Education Expenditure (Rupees) in Schools, by age category and province 
Age5-9  Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan PAKISTAN 
Expenditure (Private)       
Private Tuition (a) 159 313 211 154 186 
School Fees (b) 1259 2412 1903 2312 1617 
Books (c) 285 398 311 411 324 
Uniform (d) 260 274 362 325 306 
Transport (e) 87 383 302 205 177 
Other (f) 418 720 398 666 482 
       
       
Expenditure (Government)       
Private Tuition (g) 44 41.72 8.48 10.40 29 
School Fees (h) 107 29.22 36.12 18.47 63 
Books (i) 150 93.97 125.21 119.46 136 
Uniform (j) 186 94.38 182.21 124.14 167 
Transport (k) 22 4.61 7.92 4.96 12 
Other (l) 302 273.13 253.54 193.29 263 
       
       
t-value of difference in (a) 
and (g)  
 -9.9 -12.0 -11.5 -7.3 -20.3 
t-value of difference in (b) 
and (h) 
 -30.6 -29.9 -27.0 -31.3 -57.1 
t-value of difference in (c) 
and (i) 
 -20.0 -28.0 -22.5 -19.4 -42.5 
t-value of difference in (d) 
and (j) 
 -12.5 -22.5 -19.9 -14.4 -34.2 
t-value of difference in (e) 
and (k)  
 -5.5 -13.8 -11.5 -8.8 -17.9 
t-value of difference in (f) 
and (l) 
 -9.2 -19.5 -10.1 -15.3 -26.5 
       
Age10-14       
Expenditure (Private)       
Private Tuition  (m) 237 491 483 298 318 
School Fees (n) 1712 2682 2154 2354 1992 
Books (o) 472 503 491 482 495 
Uniform (p) 361 326 490 330 401 
Transport (q) 110 488 476 128 238 
Other (r) 593 910 607 756 649 
       
Expenditure (Government)       
Private Tuition (s)   117 63 17 9 59 
Admissions and Fees (t) 246 101 84 29 146 
Books (u) 333 213   240 269 287 
Uniform (v) 302 175 284 157 267 
Transport (w) 60 45 58 28 48 
Other (x) 449 407 379 272 386 
       
t-value of difference in (m) 
and (s)  
 -5.7 -10.3 -14.9 -6.2 -18.5 
t-value of difference in (n) 
and (t) 
 -32.7 -30.3 -34.8 -35.5 -64.3 
t-value of difference in (o) 
and (u) 
 -12.4 -17.5 -20.8 -7.4 -28.9 
t-value of difference in (p) 
and (v) 
 -6.3 -11.1 -15.6 -9.2 -21.9 
t-value of difference in (q) 
and (w)  
 -2.9 -12.1 -12.0 -2.8 -15.1 
t-value of difference in (r) 
and (x) 
 -6.0 -14.6 -9.9 -10.8 -19.4 
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Table 2 (continued): Annual Education Expenditure (Rupees) in Schools, by age category and province 
Age15-19  Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan PAKISTAN 
Expenditure (Private)       
Private Tuition  (a) 299.3 798.5 354.7 234.8 404.3 
School Fees (b) 2737.4 4421.6 4011.2 3428.3 3328.0 
Books (c) 643.9 675.2 620.8 907.8 677.3 
Uniform (d) 424.3 436.9 582.3 373.9 491.3 
Transport (e) 228.1 842.9 494.6 704.3 438.4 
Other (f) 898.8 1585.0 831.9 814.6 1019.3 
       
Expenditure (Government)       
Private Tuition (g) 466.1 239.3 160.1 17.8 257.3 
School Fees (h) 806.9 455.3 481.5 141.1 534.1 
Books (i) 608.9 394.2 475.6 491.2 523.8 
Uniform (j) 394.0 244.8 434.1 231.2 365.1 
Transport (k) 315.2 344.3 343.8 66.4 283.8 
Other (l) 885.4 915.3 880.4 495.4 812.0 
       
t-value of difference in (a) 
and (g)  
 2.1 -4.6 -2.3 -4.7 -3.3 
t-value of difference in (b) 
and (h) 
 -15.7 -21.9 -21.9 -18.1 -37.7 
t-value of difference in (c) 
and (i) 
 -1.0 -8.2 -3.9 -4.0 -7.9 
t-value of difference in (d) 
and (j) 
 -1.4 -7.0 -4.5 -3.0 -9.0 
t-value of difference in (e) 
and (k)  
 1.2 -5.2 -1.5 -6.3 -3.7 
t-value of difference in (f) 
and (l) 
 -0.2 -6.5 0.5 -1.6 -4.1 
Note: Private tuition fees include expense incurred in last year on private home tuition; Admissions and fees records annual expense on 
admission, registration, fees funds and donations; Books includes expense incurred on books and other school supplies; Uniform includes 
expenditure on general school uniform and sport uniforms etc.; Transport includes expenditure incurred travelling to and from school; Other 
includes expenditure on pocket money, boarding and lodging if living away from home and student membership fees on sports, clubs and 
libraries etc.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3A: Gender Difference in School-Choice, Raw, OLS and FE Estimates (Age 5-9) 
Age 5-9 Enrolled children only 
 Mean of 
Private 
Raw Gender 
Difference 
(M – F) in 
Private 
Attendancei
Coefficient on MALE (OLS) 
with controlsii
Coefficient on MALE in 
Fixed Effects modeliii
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
   Coefficient  
(x100) 
t-value Coefficient 
(x100) 
t-value 
Punjab 37.7  3.6* 5.0 3.9*** 7.3 3.9*** 
Sindh 25.2 -4.7** -4.3 -1.9* 3.1 1.9* 
NWFP 24.2  1.6 1.6 0.7 7.7 2.9*** 
Balochistan 11.1  1.8 1.7 0.6 7.1 2.3** 
Pakistan 29.7  0.9 4.7 5.7*** 8.0 6.8*** 
       
Note: (i) has been computed from the weighted figures reported in Table 5.1; (ii) taken from LPM2 results in Appendix Table 5.1 and (iii) 
estimates based on LPM estimation using household fixed effects; * denotes significance at 10 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1 % or better.  
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Table 3B: Gender Difference in School Choice, Raw, OLS and FE Estimates (Age 10-14) 
Age 10-14 Enrolled children only 
 Mean of 
Private 
Raw Gender 
Difference 
(M – F) in 
Private 
Attendancei
Coefficient on MALE (OLS) 
with controlsii
Coefficient on MALE in 
Fixed Effects modeliii
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
   Coefficient  
(x100) 
t-value Coefficient 
(x100) 
t-value 
Punjab 27.4 -6.0*** -0.5 -0.4 3.6 1.3 
Sindh 20.4 -8.1** 1.1 0.5 8.7 2.2** 
NWFP 18.6  4.0 11.2 4.9*** 14.3 3.9*** 
Balochistan 7.7 1.5 9.3 3.5*** 7.3 2.2** 
Pakistan 21.6 -5.2*** 3.9 4.7*** 7.5 4.6*** 
       
See Note in Table 3A. 
 
 
Table 3C:Gender Difference in School Choice, Raw, OLS and FE Estimates (Age 15-19) 
Age 15-19 Enrolled children only 
 Mean of 
Private 
Raw Gender 
Difference 
(M – F) in 
Private 
Attendancei
Coefficient on MALE (OLS) 
with controlsii
Coefficient on MALE in 
Fixed Effects modeliii
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
   Coefficient  
(x100) 
t-value Coefficient 
(x100) 
t-value 
Punjab 19.4 -4.3 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.2 
Sindh 17.6 -2.1 1.7 0.5 11.8 2.1* 
NWFP 12.2 -2.5 3.5 1.0 6.1 0.9 
Balochistan 5.0 -2.4 2.4 0.6 -8.3 -1.5 
Pakistan 15.6 -4.3** 0.8 0.7 4.0 1.4 
       
See Note in Table 3A. 
 
 
Table 4: Definitions of Variables Used in School-Choice and Achievement Production Functions 
Variable Description 
ACHIEVE Student’s total cognitive achievement score (sum of READING and 
MATHS), maximum value 50 
READING Student’s total score in literacy/language test (English or Urdu), maximum 
value 25 
MATHS Student’s total score in mathematics test, maximum value 25 
MALE Dummy equals1 if male child, 0 if female 
AGE_YRS Child’s age in years 
RAVEN Student’s score in the ability test (Raven’s Progressive Matrices) max = 60. 
EDU_WISH Child’s educational aspirations, index from 1 to 6, for example 1=child 
aspires to complete education up to class 8th, 2 = aspires completion till class 
10th, 6 = aspires completion of professional degree  
HTU_TAKEN Number of hours of paid home tuition taken by child (divided by 1000) 
SABSENTT
                                                
26 Number of days child absent from schools in month of September, 2002 
BOOKS Number of books in child’s home (divided by 1000) 
LNFINCOME Natural log of father’s income (rupees per month) 
 
26 This variable was highly skewed with a very large proportion of values (40 percent) taking the value 0. Only 
19 students were outliers (being absent for more than 10 days). This variable was censored at 10 so as to reduce 
the skewness of the distribution and the effect of outliers. 
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TSIBLING Total number of siblings of child, other than child 
MEDYRS Mother’s completed years of education 
FREEHELP Number of hours of help child gets in studies at home from other siblings, 
parents, relatives or friends 
URBAN Dummy equals 1 if school in urban locality, 0 if rural 
WEALTH127 Index of monetary value of assets in the household (divided by 1000) 
FSELFEMP Dummy equals 1 if father is self employed, 0 otherwise 
FPROFEMP Dummy equals 1 if father is professionally employed, 0 otherwise 
FOCCUPOTH Dummy equals 1 if father’s occupation other than self employed or 
professionally employed, 0 otherwise 
FEDYRS Father’s completed years of education 
 
 
 
Table 5: Mean Characteristics of Students by School-Type  
Variable G P ALL (G+P) P - G t-value (P – G) 
ACHIEVE 20.79 
(5.76) 
26.60 
(7.58) 
23.29 
(7.21) 
5.81 
18.91 
 
*** 
READING 13.30 
(3.61) 
15.80 
(4.21) 
14.38 
(4.07) 
1.08 
13.87 
 
*** 
MATHS 7.48 
(3.31) 
10.79 
(4.51) 
8.91 
(4.21) 
3.31 
18.37 
 
*** 
MALE 0.47 
(0.50) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
-0.01 
0.63 
 
AGE_YRS 13.71 
(1.26) 
13.52 
(0.94) 
13.63 
(1.13) 
-0.19 
-3.44 
 
*** 
RAVEN 25.79 
(9.74) 
32.69 
(10.15) 
28.77 
(10.49) 
6.90 
14.97 
 
*** 
EDU_WISH 4.46 
(1.39) 
5.14 
(1.26) 
4.75 
(1.38) 
0.68 
11.01 
 
*** 
HTU_TAKEN 0.28 
(0.29) 
0.24 
(0.30) 
0.26 
(0.29) 
-0.04 
-3.02 
 
*** 
SABSENT 1.90 
(2.04) 
1.65 
(2.14) 
1.79 
(2.09) 
-0.25 
-2.59 
 
*** 
BOOKS_1000 0.12 
(0.21) 
0.22 
(0.38) 
0.16 
(0.30) 
0.10 
7.81 
 
*** 
LNFINCOME 8.55 
(1.64) 
9.38 
(1.41) 
8.91 
(1.60) 
0.83 
11.63 
 
*** 
TSIBLING 4.24 
(1.83) 
3.50 
(1.70) 
3.92 
(1.81) 
-0.74 
-8.93 
 
*** 
MEDYRS 5.80 
(4.82) 
8.76 
(4.92) 
7.08 
(5.08) 
2.96 
13.12 
 
*** 
FREEHELP 10.13 
(11.52) 
6.20 
(8.55) 
8.44 
(10.53) 
-3.93 
-8.18 
 
*** 
URBAN 0.80 
(0.40) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.82 
(0.39) 
0.04 
2.29 
 
** 
WEALTH1 0.15 
(0.09) 
0.22 
(0.10) 
0.18 
(0.10) 
0.07 
15.15 
 
*** 
FSELFEMP 0.46 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.01 
0.40 
 
FPROFEMP 0.11 
(0.32) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.13 
7.53 
 
*** 
FOCCUPOTH 0.42 
(0.49) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
-0.13 
-6.28 
 
*** 
FEDYRS 
8.68 
(4.65) 
11.18 
(4.44) 
9.76 
(4.73) 
2.50 
11.80 
 
*** 
 
       
N 1073 814 1887    
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard deviations. For Yes=1/No=0 type of variables, the mean represents the percentage of ones in 
the sample. * denotes significance at 10 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1 % or better.  G = government school sample and P = private school 
sample.  
                                                 
27 The WEALTH1 index was computed by assigning the following values to the assets available at the child’s 
home: 1 each to fans, clocks, beds, radio, tape recorder and electric iron, 2 each to pit toilet, bicycle and black 
and white TV, 5 each to a  flush toilet, tap water and cooking stove, 10 each to a VCR, colour TV, electricity, 
telephone, camera and sewing machine, 20 each to washing machine and fridge and scooter/motorcycle, 50 each 
to a computer, air conditioner and satellite dish and 100 to a car.    
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Table 6: OLS estimates (pooled sample) with and without school-type dummy 
OLS without PRIVATE 
(a) 
OLS with PRIVATE 
(b) 
Variable 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
CONSTANT 13.529 5.94 *** 15.009 7.31 *** 
MALE 0.883 1.40  0.888 1.61  
AGE_YRS -0.318 -2.46 ** -0.381 -3.05 *** 
RAVEN 0.312 12.78 *** 0.288 13.26 *** 
EDU_WISH 0.751 6.17 *** 0.659 5.86 *** 
HTU_TAKEN -1.137 -1.69 * -0.858 -1.57  
SABSENT -0.232 -2.93 *** -0.208 -2.84 *** 
BOOKS 2.031 5.20 *** 1.704 4.83 *** 
LNFINCOME 0.169 1.66 * 0.051 0.54  
TSIBLING -0.257 -2.77 *** -0.201 -2.21 ** 
MEDYRS 0.116 3.10 *** 0.082 2.31 ** 
FREEHELP -0.035 -2.21 ** -0.009 -0.58  
URBAN 0.630 0.80  0.858 1.11  
PRIVATE - -  2.541 4.22 *** 
       
N 
R2
1887 
0.44 
1887 
0.46 
Note: Dependent variable is ACHIEVE; t-values are robust and corrected for cluster effects (school-level); * represents significance at 10 
%, ** at 5 % and * at 1 % or better.  
 
 
Table 7: OLS Production Functions - Government School Students 
Dependent Variable  
ACHIEVE  
(a) 
Dependent Variable   
READ 
(b) 
Dependent Variable  
MATHS 
(c) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
CONSTANT 15.989 10.09 *** 13.218 10.80 *** 2.772 2.89 *** 
MALE 0.055 0.08  -1.205 -2.87 *** 1.260 3.79 *** 
AGE_YRS -0.376 -2.89 *** -0.323 -3.49 *** -0.053 -0.87  
RAVEN 0.222 9.28 *** 0.111 8.49 *** 0.111 8.26 *** 
EDU_WISH 0.646 5.37 *** 0.322 3.53 *** 0.324 4.08 *** 
HTU_TAKEN_1000 -1.178 -2.20 ** -0.557 -1.92 * -0.621 -1.59  
SABSENT -0.177 -2.31 ** -0.090 -1.79 * -0.087 -1.90 * 
BOOKS_1000 0.878 1.63  0.242 0.61  0.636 2.82 *** 
LNFINCOME 0.166 2.13 ** 0.080 1.50  0.086 1.47  
TSIBLING -0.096 -0.83  0.003 0.04  -0.099 -1.70 * 
MEDYRS 0.048 1.16  0.016 0.53  0.032 1.84 * 
FREEHELP -0.029 -2.49 ** -0.012 -1.36  -0.017 -2.40 ** 
URBAN 1.105 1.17  0.515 0.88  0.590 1.44  
          
N 
R2
Mean 
 (Dependent Variable) 
1073 
0.287 
20.788 
1073 
0.223 
13.303 
1073 
0.247 
7.485 
Note: The dependent variable is as specified; * represents significance at 10 %, ** at 5 % and * at 1 % or better; All t-values are robust and 
corrected for clustering (school level). 
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Table 8: OLS Production Functions – Private School Students 
Dependent Variable  
ACHIEVE 
(a) 
Dependent Variable   
READ 
(b) 
Dependent Variable  
MATHS 
(c) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
CONSTANT 16.085 3.47 *** 17.243 5.24 *** -1.157 -0.41  
MALE 1.543 1.97 ** -0.008 -0.01  1.550 2.95 *** 
AGE_YRS -0.406 -1.52  -0.534 -2.80 *** 0.128 0.88  
RAVEN 0.365 11.66 *** 0.165 8.73 *** 0.200 11.08 *** 
EDU_WISH 0.730 3.73 *** 0.442 2.98 *** 0.288 2.94 *** 
HTU_TAKEN_1000 0.053 0.05  0.273 0.44  -0.220 -0.37  
SABSENT -0.235 -2.01 ** -0.087 -1.13  -0.148 -2.29 ** 
BOOKS_1000 1.559 3.99 *** 0.454 1.66 * 1.105 3.24 *** 
LNFINCOME -0.155 -0.92  -0.217 -2.34 ** 0.062 0.53  
TSIBLING -0.292 -2.04 ** -0.125 -1.39  -0.167 -2.06 ** 
MEDYRS 0.088 1.43  0.005 0.14  0.082 2.13 ** 
FREEHELP 0.053 1.71 * 0.024 1.23  0.028 1.33  
URBAN 1.217 1.19  0.441 0.62  0.776 1.60  
          
N 
R2
Mean  
(Dependent Variable) 
814 
0.465 
26.598 
814 
0.292 
15.805 
814 
0.449 
10.794 
Note: The dependent variable is as specified; * represents significance at 10 %, ** at 5 % and * at 1 % or better; All t-values are robust and 
corrected for clustering (school level). 
 
 
Table 9: Raw and Standardised Achievement, Reading and Maths Score by School-Type 
 
Equation  Achievement Points  Achievement 
Advantage Points 
% Private Advantage 
over Government 
  G P  AP – AG 
(b – a) 
{(P-G)/G}*100 
  (a) (b)  (c) (d) 
Maths       
Raw  7.48 10.79  3.31 44.3 
OLS standardised  8.10 9.63  1.53 18.9 
Heckman standardised  7.16 9.82  3.14 37.2 
       
Reading       
Raw  13.30 15.80  2.50 18.8 
OLS standardised  13.87 14.98  1.11 8.0 
Heckman standardised  13.78 14.26  0.48 3.5 
       
Achievement        
Raw  20.79 26.60  5.81 27.9 
OLS standardised  21.97 24.62  2.65 12.1 
Heckman standardised  20.94 24.08  3.14 15.0 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Determinants of Choice of School-Type 
PRIVATE Variable 
Coefficient t-value 
CONSTANT -3.256 -6.07 *** 
MALE -0.011 -0.16  
AGE_YRS 0.078 2.50 ** 
RAVEN 0.027 7.72 *** 
EDU_WISH 0.098 3.56 *** 
HTU_TAKEN -0.409 -3.65 *** 
BOOKS 0.476 3.46 *** 
LNFINCOME 0.108 4.31 *** 
TSIBLING -0.070 -3.50 *** 
MEDYRS 0.018 1.83 * 
FREEHELP -0.039 -10.47 *** 
URBAN -0.315 -3.49 *** 
WEALTH1 2.238 5.32 *** 
FSELFEMP 0.074 1.00  
FPROFEMP 0.212 2.09 ** 
FEDYRS 0.007 0.71  
    
Log L 
Pseudo-R2
N (Un-Censored) 
-1013.549 
0.214 
1887 
Note: The dependent variable is PRIVATE = 1 if school is private and PRIVATE = 0 for a government school; * represents significance at 
10 %, ** at 5 % and * at 1 % or better; Exclusion restrictions = [WEALTH1, FSELFEMP, FPROFEMP, FEDYRS] with FOCCUPOTH as 
excluded category among father’s employment status. 
 
A2: Selection-corrected Achievement Equations 
Government Private  
Variable 
 
Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value 
CONSTANT 17.170 7.03 *** 14.477 2.64 *** 
MALE 0.071 0.22  1.548 3.74 *** 
AGE_YRS -0.432 -3.13 *** -0.384 -1.67 * 
RAVEN 0.201 8.92 *** 0.374 11.73 *** 
EDU_WISH 0.570 4.21 *** 0.771 3.69 *** 
HTU_TAKEN_1000 -0.949 -1.71 * -0.060 -0.08  
SABSENT -0.179 -2.41 ** -0.234 -2.56 ** 
BOOKS_1000 0.455 0.57  1.656 2.79 *** 
LNFINCOME 0.076 0.65  -0.097 -0.47  
TSIBLING -0.044 -0.45  -0.316 -2.25 *** 
MEDYRS 0.017 0.39  0.099 1.67 * 
FREEHELP -0.007 -0.32  0.040 1.04  
URBAN 1.306 3.02 *** 1.121 1.81 * 
       
λ 1.508 1.38  0.568 0.40  
Wald (Chi2) 
N (Uncensored) 
487.37 
1073 
674.75 
814 
Note: The dependent variable is ACHIEVE; * represents significance at 10 %, ** at 5 % and * at 1 % or better; 
 
35 
 
For publication enquiries, please contact:
Communication Officer
RECOUP
Faculty of Education
184 Hills Road
Cambridge CB2 8PQ
United Kingdom
tel: (01223) 507231     e-mail: recoup@hermes.cam.ac.uk     
www.educ.cam.ac.uk/RECOUP/index.html
ISSN 1754–2464
